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III. As yet, we have no evidence regarding the way these cuts will be accomplished, although the annual release of conscripts whose service is complete begins this month in the USSR and its satellites. ~~The 8 September press version of the Soviet release order--the first to be received--is no different from orders of previous years.~~  
~~A. However,~~ We assume that more than the usual number of conscripts will be released.

IV. We also expect that the cuts will be made in a manner that causes minimal losses in overall Bloc combat capabilities. ~~Measures readily available to minimize such losses include:~~

A. Limitation of any reduction to the lowest ranks of conscripts (thereby leaving the officer and non-com groups little affected).

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NSC BRIEFING

7 September 1955

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SATELLITE ARMY CUTS

- I. We consider the recent well-publicized series of announcements by various Eastern European satellites regarding cuts in their armed forces to be primarily a Bloc effort to give an appearance of substance to the current Soviet disarmament campaign. In our view, the Bloc hopes that these announcements will serve several important objectives:
  - A. To bolster Soviet claims that the Bloc's military threat against the West is rapidly becoming non-existent.
  - B. To recapture public interest in the USSR's 10 May disarmament proposals and thereby divert world attention from the dramatic US proposal for aerial inspection.

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C. In the long run, to weaken the Western nations' united position in matters of mutual defense and East-West negotiations.

II. The present series of announcements was initiated by the USSR on 13 August with a statement that 640,000 men (~~or 16% of estimated total military manpower~~) would be cut from the Soviet armed forces by the end of 1955. *(We estimate this to be 16% their military manpower, as indicated on the chart)*

Subsequent announcements by Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Poland (~~see chart~~) have promised cuts on an average of 16 to 18 percent.

B. Hungary has promised a cut of some 12%.

C. The fifth satellite heard from--Albania, whose armed forces are already negligible--has promised a nearly 30% reduction.

D. Bulgaria, as yet unheard from, is expected to follow suit with a similar headline-grabbing announcement.

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7 September 1955

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MIDDLE EAST

- I. The series of raids and counter-raids on the Egypt-Israel frontier during the past two weeks have now come to an end, and both parties appear willing to maintain the "cease-fire" which each has promised the UN truce authorities to enforce along the Gaza strip. The area is thus likely to remain relatively calm in the immediate future. However, so long as basic border problems remain unsolved, occasional flare-ups can be expected.
- A. A new element in the situation was Egypt's unusually aggressive attitude -- reflected both in threats of "terror" by Egyptian radio broadcasts and in audacious military operations.
1. Although Egyptian "commando" groups, who were poised for a coordinated series of raids on 25 August, received countermanding

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o did not get the new orders in time -- struck deep into Israeli territory. The Israeli retaliation, the blowing-up of an Egyptian headquarters at ~~Khan Yunis~~ in the Gaza strip, was the high point in the fortnight's series of raids and reprisals.

B. It seems possible that Egypt's belligerent posture may have been connected with that Government's internal problems. The Gaza fighting certainly distracted the Egyptian public from other developments, including Egypt's diminishing influence in the Sudan and the ousting of Major Salah Salim, Minister of National Guidance (propaganda) and also Minister for Sudan Affairs.

II. Major Salim was one of the most influential members of the 11-man Revolutionary Command Council, which has ruled Egypt since 1952. The immediate cause for

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his dismissal, after a stormy Council meeting on 26 August, was the charge of failure to win the Sudan to union with Egypt. However, for the past year, Salim has been a general source of trouble to Prime Minister Nasr.

- A. He has led a faction opposing Nasr's plans to set up a new Egyptian parliament next year.
- B. He has been one of the most emotional spokesmen for an anti-West, pro-neutral position within the Egyptian government.
- C. Since Nasr's continued authority, in the last analysis, depends upon the support of the Egyptian Army, a "tough" attitude towards Israel may well have been the price Nasr felt he had to pay to avoid Army opposition to Salim's ouster.

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- III. Although the departure of anti-Western Salim from Government ranks should bring some improvement in US-Egyptian relations, it is unlikely that the Nasr regime will abandon the potentially lucrative game of playing off the West against the Orbit. One example is Egypt's flirtation with the USSR over Soviet offers of economic and military aid (reportedly including jet fighters and bombers, as well as tanks).
- A. Other examples of this game have included Nasr's 11 August acceptance of an invitation to visit the USSR next spring and the 22 August announcement of a three-year trade agreement with Communist China (to include, among other deals, an annual swap of Chinese steel for Egyptian cotton valued at \$15 million).

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IV. The Orbit ~~Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000400100002-6~~ ~~Approach~~ to win friends in the Middle East has not been confined to Egypt alone. We know of Soviet or Satellite trade and aid contacts with such Middle Eastern states as Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. I hope to present a detailed report on this subject in the near future. ~~For the present, in summary:~~

- A. The Czechs have reportedly sold the Afghans some \$3 million worth of arms, and we know of an Afghan transfer of some \$3 million from a US to a Swiss bank.
- B. The USSR is pressuring Saudi Arabia to establish diplomatic relations, and coupling <sup>its</sup> ~~their~~ pressure with an offer of Soviet arms to King Saud.
- C. Finally, we have intimations of Soviet approaches to Syria with offers of military equipment and diplomatic support.

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NSC BRIEFING

8 SEPTEMBER 1955

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CYPRUS - OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS

- I. NATO's permanent council has been called to meet today (Thursday) to discuss the threatening situation, resulting from Turkish riots at Izmir (Smyrna) - a NATO headquarters. *As you know,* Both Greece and Turkey are, ~~of~~ ~~Greece~~, NATO members.
- II. The Greek Foreign Ministry--greatly disturbed over the riots in Turkey--has discussed the situation with the American charge in Athens. The Foreign Ministry is planning to evacuate the families of its military personnel stationed at Izmir.
- III. Late Department of State reports from Istanbul (analyzing developments during the past two days) indicate that an inflammatory press campaign in recent days--including statements by Turkish officials--may have been the spark that touched off the riots.

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IV. The Turks ~~Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000400100002-6~~ Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir have been put under martial law and some 2,000 rioters have been arrested.

V. (A possible chuckle for the Council: The fabulous Hilton "Hotel Istambul," opened this summer, now is harboring a Turkish cavalry detachment on its front lawn).

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NSC BRIEFING

7 SEPTEMBER 1955

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CYPRUS TALKS END

- I. The London conference on the Cyprus question has ended in complete disagreement. The British, ~~whose~~ negotiating position was strengthened by Turkish adamancy against any concessions to Greece, <sup>The British</sup> made an offer of limited self-government for Cyprus under a new constitution together with the creation of a tripartite committee in London to examine details of the proposed new constitution.
- A. The Greek reaction was noncommittal and the Turkish reaction was "very negative." The conference forthwith adjourned on 7 September.
- B. Eventual Greek rejection of the offer is expected, since it omitted any assurance of eventual Cypriot self-determination.
- C. Turkey, in turn probably will not accept the proposal, because it envisages proportional rather than equal parliamentary representation for the island's Turkish minority ~~SECRET~~

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II. The immediate results of the London conference's failure are likely to be:

- A. Further deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations, with increasingly bitter mutual recriminations and a lessening of cooperation in NATO and the Balkan alliance.
  - 1. The violent Turk outbreaks on 6 September in Istanbul and Izmir have already illustrated the sharp decline of Greek-Turkish friendship. Further manifestations may be expected.
- B. Renewed violence on Cyprus, where the influence of Nationalist extremists will be strengthened.
  - 1. Danger to US property and interests on the island from terrorist attacks may become acute.

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*will be undertaken*  
C. Intense diplomatic campaigns by Greece, Turkey and Britain in preparation for a bitter Cyprus debate at the session of the UN General Assembly, starting 20 September.

III. Failure of the conference will also be a serious blow to American prestige in Greece, because the Greeks regard the US as partly responsible for the outcome.

A. With a reduction of US influence, the small but growing tendency towards neutralism in Greece can be expected to gain new strength.

IV. Finally, the failure will have a direct impact on the present Greek government.

A. Failure of the Greeks to win any real concessions will probably weaken the Rally government still further.

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B. In consequence, the King, who has been concerned that the government at present is leaderless, may appoint a provisional prime minister and call for new general elections.

1. The King believes that ailing Prime Minister Papagos might now take this opportunity to resign "as a hero who has done his best."

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8 SEPTEMBER 1955

**FRENCH NORTH AFRICA**

- I. Early last week, the French Cabinet finally accepted Premier Faure's "five-point" program for a solution to the Morocco problem.
  - A. However, press reports indicate doubt in French Government circles that Faure's self-established 12 September "deadline" will be met.
  - B. Additionally, the Moroccan nationalists, with whom Faure had hammered out a tentative agreement on his "five points" before presenting them to his Cabinet, are already protesting the French Government's "indécision, slowness and intransigence."
- II. The Faure package calls for:
  - A. A two-way parlay involving replacement of Moroccan Resident General Grandval (unpopular with the settlers) by Boyer de Latour (unpopular

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both ~~with the Fritlers and the Moroccans~~ and the withdrawal of the present Sultan, Mohamed ben Arafa.

- B. A three-way parlay: establishment of a "Council of the Throne" formation of a "representative" government under a Moroccan named by that Council, and return of French-deposed former Sultan ben Youssef from exile in Madagascar to some residence in France.

III. ~~The first half of Faure's two way parlay has already been accomplished.~~  
However, ~~the second~~ removal of ben Arafa ~~is~~ is a present stumbling-block in the plan.

- A. Despite formal Cabinet acceptance of Faure's plan to oust Arafa, at least two cabinet members have reservations. Defense Minister Koenig apparently opposes the Sultan's removal, while Foreign Minister <sup>even</sup> Binay objects to pressure being applied for Arafa's resignation.

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B. These ~~political tensions~~ together with aroused public opinion as a result of Moroccan bloodshed, might well threaten Faure's premiership, were the French National Assembly in session. However, the Assembly is not scheduled to reconvene until 4 October and an earlier special session appears improbable.

~~C. It therefore appears that, even should ben Arafat remain adamant (which seems unlikely), the Faure Government's tenure is safe at least until October.~~

IV. ~~The remaining three of Faure's "five points" also have their pitfalls.~~ Much depends on the reaction of exiled ben Youssef. Two French representatives have conferred with him in Madagascar, and a ~~an~~ report states that his initial reaction has been cool.

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- A. Ben Youssef reportedly has demanded that the French publicly admit his 1953 removal was illegal and also instruct the settlers to cease counter-terrorist attacks.
- B. He further implied that he would issue no statement until he has left Madagascar.
- V. Meanwhile, nationalist terrorism continues throughout Morocco despite strong French military and police repression. A general strike, apparently called by the nationalists for 12 September in Casablanca, may well create additional security problems.

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A. French authorities are also concerned over evidence of widespread contact and consultation among the Berber tribes of the interior, upon many of whom the French have previously counted for support.

1. French troops in Morocco now total more than 60,000 and are constantly being reinforced by the arrival of small units from metropolitan France.

2. However, outbursts similar to the 20 August Berber massacre at Qued Zem would severely tax France's thin-spread forces in Morocco.

V. Elsewhere in French North Africa, apprehension exists that a new flare-up is imminent in Algeria, despite the extension of a state of emergency to all four Algerian Departments and the arrival of further troop reinforcements from France.

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- A. French troops in Algeria now number more than 120,000, supplemented by general and special police units, air force and naval groups and a substantial number of quasi-military units.
1. Some settlers have been armed, despite the objections of the Governor General, and are reported to be taking vigilante action against the natives.
  - ~~2. Field reports state that, following the stiff French reprisals for the 20 August uprisings in the Constantine-Philippeville area, native support for extremist nationalists has become more widespread and stronger and that the situation throughout the Constantine region remains tense.~~
- B. Perhaps the most alarming aspect of the present disorders is the tendency among conservative French officials and settlers to make

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the US, together with Egypt, a scapegoat. Both press comment  
and private utterances in Morocco and Algeria have been strongly  
anti-American, to the point of claiming US support for the rebels.

NSC BRIEFING

7 September 1955

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ARGENTINE DEVELOPMENTS

- I. Peron's 31 August speech, in which he withdrew his earlier offer to resign, and called on his followers to prepare to fight violence with "even greater violence," may have led army leaders to reconsider their support of him.
  - A. The top military leadership, which holds the dominant power position in the government, has been supporting Peron on the condition that he follow moderate policies.
  - B. Reportedly this support of Peron by the army leaders has been strongly disliked in the lower military echelons, particularly in the provinces. Even some high ranking officers advocated Peron's resignation on 30 August, according to an Argentine government source.

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has

reported that the Federal Police have information that a revolt may break out this week, and that heavy machine guns have been brought into police headquarters.

II. A revolution beginning in the provinces would probably be unsuccessful unless there was close cooperation and coordination among the provincial commands and the rebel forces in the Navy and Air Force.

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- A. However, if the army top command in Buenos Aires tried to force Peron out, and he called on the Argentine General Confederation of Labor to support him, civil war could ensue.
- B. The US Embassy in Buenos Aires reported that the 31 August labor rally and general strike was a successful demonstration of Peron's continued labor support and his ability to marshall the masses.
- C. To date, no revolutionary outbreaks have been reported.

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NSC BRIEFING

6 September 1955

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ANTARCTICA

I. THE FACTS

A. Soviet participation in the International Geophysical Year

In September 1954 the Soviet Union accepted an invitation to participate in the IGY, during 1957-58. At this time no specific plans were revealed, but a plea was made to increase the program in seismology and gravimetry.

B. Soviet plans for Antarctic program of the IGY

1. With less than a week's advance notice the USSR submitted a letter of interest to participate in the Antarctic program, and a small Soviet delegation appeared at the Antarctic Conference in Paris on 6 -10 July 1955. (The Soviets are also attending a supplementary conference at Appledorf on 6 September with a full technical complement to make

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detailed plans and arrangements.)

2. The initial announcement offered to establish an installation at one of two stations listed as needed by the Special Committee for the IGY.
3. Later the Soviet participation was expanded to two more stations, one at the geomagnetic pole, and the other at the South Pole. The latter has since been recommended against by the Antarctic Conference, which has suggested location in another continental position. (See Map.)

C. Soviet operational plans

1. The expedition will start for the Knox Coast base in November, 1955.

*(This confirmed by Moscow Radio just today (75th) yesterday)*  
2. The leader will be Dr. Somov, Deputy Director of the Arctic Institute and

an experienced Arctic explorer who headed the Soviet Arctic Drift

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Station, SP-II.

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3. The personnel will include not only scientists of the Academy of Science, Approved For Release 2001/09/01 : CIA-RDP80R01443R000400100002-6 but, more significantly, scientists of governmental organizations -- the Chief Directorate of the Hydro-meteorological Service, and the Chief Directorate of the Northern Sea Route.
4. Notwithstanding the adverse recommendation of the Antarctic Conference not to locate at the South Pole, the Soviets have not given up the idea.
5. The expedition will consist of two special vessels, a special aircraft detachment of several transport planes and helicopters, in addition to the full range of tractors, amphibious craft, and the latest scientific instruments.
6. The program of work will include not only the studies of the IGY program, *will undoubtedly also include* the physical

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## II. THE IMPLICATIONS

### A. The Soviet entry on the continent will strengthen their claims to a voice in the settlement of the sovereignty problem

1. Up to the present the Soviet claim to rights in the Antarctic is based on the alleged prior discovery of continental Antarctica by a Russian exploration expedition of 1819-21 under Bellingshausen. (This is disputed by both American and British claims.)
2. In 1939 the Soviets protested a Norwegian claim and reserved the right to participate in the resolution of the problem.
3. In June 1950 the USSR notified the U.S. and other nations active in Antarctica that: (a) the USSR cannot agree with a resolution of Antarctic sovereignty without Soviet participation, (b) the economic value

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of Antarctica is significant to all nations including the USSR, which also is a signatory to the International Whaling Convention of 1948, and (c) the continent is a suitable base for meteorological observations that are significant to the northern hemisphere.

4. The Soviets have shown an interest in the mapping of Antarctica. We believe that the Soviets will undertake the establishment of ground control, and may undertake some aerial photography. The Soviets have a known capability to establish ground control by means of astronomic positions corrected for deflections of the vertical to achieve accuracies adequate for mapping at 1:100,000. (No such mapping has been done by the U.S., or is planned for the 1955-56 expedition.)

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B. The Soviets will gain their first actual entry on the continent

(WHALEERS  
MAY HAVE  
TOUCHED.)

- ✓ This will provide the opportunity to establish bases for a period of two or more years and would, therefore, constitute a significant step in effective occupation. This would also strengthen their interests by providing substance to their propaganda activities to lay the groundwork for a possible claim.

### III. CONCLUSION

Soviet participation in the IGY program indicates clearly that the USSR intends to reassert its position that no sovereignty issue in the area can be decided without its participation. Moreover, the scope of the Soviet effort -- in particular its explicit government membership and its interest in mapping -- suggests

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strongly a Soviet effort to lay the maximum groundwork for actual  
territorial claims in the Antarctic, possibly even including the area of  
the Pole itself.

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